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
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Prof. Goldwin Smith, LL.D., etc.

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**THE IMPERIAL RAID
IN
SOUTH AFRICA**



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


Extending the Blessings of Civilization to our Brother who Sits in Darkness has been a good trade and has paid well, on the whole. . . . But Christendom has been playing it badly of late years, and must certainly suffer by it, in my opinion. She has been so eager to get every stake that appeared on the green cloth, that the People who Sit in Darkness have noticed it. They have become suspicious of the Blessings of Civilization. More—they have begun to examine them. This is not well.

MARK TWAIN.



NEW YORK
1901




PREFACE

THE following paper was read before a small meeting of friends interested in the subject, and has been printed by request. Some criticisms of another paper, read at the same meeting, have been omitted, as that paper has not been printed. A few of the omitted passages have, however, been used in the comments [page 23 *et seq.*] on an article by Mr. E. J. Hodgson, printed in the "Nineteenth Century," for August, 1900.

~~53 West Sixty-eighth Street, New York~~
February, 1901.

GEORGE HANNAH.

Skaneateles
N.Y.
U.S.A.



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THE IMPERIAL RAID IN SOUTH AFRICA

DURING the earlier period of the war in South Africa the singular spectacle could often be witnessed of American citizens disputing about a matter of which neither side could give an intelligible account. It was to be expected that loyal Britishers would sustain their government in its South African policy, but it was surprising to many Americans who became interested in the question that any considerable number of their fellow-citizens should take occasion, somewhat officially, to express sympathy with that policy, and attempt to justify the spoliation and proposed extinction of the Dutch republics. Naturally, this superserviceable advocacy of the stronger party in the contest aroused partisanship in behalf of the sorely beset Boers, but the discussions were commonly more a matter of feeling than of opinions based upon information, and generally illustrated the saying that "abuse is the logic of the ignorant." The question, having been much discussed from irreconcilable points of view, has become loaded with disputes almost wholly apart from the actual issue. In speeches and printed articles the Government of the Transvaal has been called an oligarchy, and the religion of the Boers a pretense. There is no argument in those charges, even if true; all governments become, necessarily, more or less oligarchical in war time—none more so than the Government of the United States when secession

at the South was attempted. The Boers are now fighting for their country and independence, and have been resisting British aggressions for many years; their religion has nothing to do with the matter. Nor should events prior to 1852 be brought into the discussion, except as points of interest in the history of colonization in Africa by European nations, and in the history of slavery. The Transvaal question relates entirely to such territorial holdings and rights as the Boers have in the Transvaal, derived by treaty with Great Britain in 1852, as the United States of America derived similar rights in 1783.

The Boers of the South African Republic made two unsuccessful attempts to settle permanently in African territory, within the alleged "sphere of influence" of the British Empire, before they settled in the Transvaal. There, in the wild region beyond the Vaal River, their independence was finally acknowledged by the British Government.

By the terms of the Sand River Convention of 1852 "the British Government guarantee in the fullest manner to the emigrant farmers of the Transvaal the right to manage their own affairs and to govern themselves by their own laws, without any interference on the part of the British Government; and that no encroachment shall be made by the said government on the territory beyond, to the north of the Vaal River."

The independence of the Boers of the Transvaal was not interfered with until 1877. Let Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary, tell us what then occurred. In his speech delivered June 26, 1899, he said: "Under an honest belief that a majority of the inhabitants of the Transvaal desired to be British subjects, that country, in 1877, was annexed to the British Empire."

The annexation was made by proclamation of Sir Theophilus Shepstone, the British commissioner, in which he announced that he annexed the Transvaal Republic to the dominions of the British crown. In justification of this pro-

ceeding it was alleged that some members of the Transvaal Government approved of it, and that it was necessary for the protection of the Boers against the savages. No official of the Transvaal had any authority to assent to such action, and the Boers had been defending themselves against the savages, not only in the Transvaal, but in their previous settlements, for more than forty years. They were hardly able at that period to defend themselves against the British Empire. Deputations were sent to England to protest against the spoliation of their territory, but finally they were forced to take up arms. There were several conflicts in which the British were defeated, the affair on Majuba Hill being the most noted of these fights. It became manifest that the "honest belief" mentioned by Mr. Chamberlain was erroneous, and in the same speech he has informed us that "in 1881 Mr. Gladstone's Government, of which I was then a member, restored to the Transvaal its independence."

The Boers objected to some articles arbitrarily introduced by the British into the Convention of 1881, by which what was called a retrocession of the Transvaal was made, as not being in conformity with the Convention of 1852, which was their Charter of Independence. During the discussions the British army had been heavily reinforced, and its commander, Sir Evelyn Wood, was said by Mr. Chamberlain to have held the Transvaal and its armed forces in "the hollow of his hand." The presence of General Wood and his powerful army probably convinced the Boers of the hopelessness of exacting better terms at that time; they consequently accepted the Convention, though unwillingly.

Immediately afterward the Transvaal Government began to agitate for a full restoration of its status as it existed by the Convention of 1852, President Kruger himself visiting London to conduct negotiations. The Convention of 1884 swept away the provisions of the Convention of 1881 which were objectionable to the Boers, the most repugnant being an assertion by the British of their suzerainty over the Trans-

vaal. The word was stricken out, upon the persistent demand of President Kruger, by Lord Derby, with his own hand. Both governments having accepted the Convention of 1884, the Government of the Transvaal has insisted, and still insists, that its status as it existed by the Convention of 1852 has been fully restored, as of right it should have been.

For a year or two after the Convention of 1884 was signed the questions at issue between the two countries seemed to have been disposed of. In 1886, however, the great mining wealth of the Transvaal became more generally known, and events since then have doubtless inclined the Boers to believe in the old saying that "the gold best situated is the gold yet undiscovered."

British statesmen are much given to coining phrases, oracular in form, intended to be construed, as unforeseen conditions arise, in accordance with British interests. The case as made up by Great Britain against the South African Republic is much complicated by these phrases of diversified meaning. The word suzerainty, with its equivalents hegemony, paramountcy, and overlordship, will serve as an illustration. In the House of Lords, on October 18, 1899, the Earl of Kimberley said "the word suzerainty has no meaning." Lord Salisbury, in reply, said that "though it may be true that the word has no distinct meaning, yet, having been put into a treaty, it has obtained an artificial value which prevents us from abandoning it."

The word had been stricken from the Treaty of 1884, upon demand by President Kruger, for it had been improperly inserted; yet in 1899 the House of Lords was solemnly discussing this deleted word with an "artificial value" as though it had something to do with the case.

In the Convention of 1884 the Boers had made a concession in regard to treaties with foreign nations that might affect interests of Great Britain in her South African colonies. This concession was like similar reciprocal agreements between other independent states, and none have involved

or justified a claim of suzerainty on either side, directly or by implication. Yet this act of reciprocity by the Boers has been made the ground for a reassertion by Great Britain of her claim of suzerainty, and even for extending it by attempted interference in the internal affairs of the Transvaal, in utter violation of treaty obligations.

In British statements of any question it seems to be assumed that anything inimical to the material interests of the British Empire is inherently wrong. Ex-President Garrison has pointed out, in his recent "Musings upon Current Events," that "the Briton has carefully limited his charters of liberty to a declaration of his own rights." In a letter to the London correspondent of the "New York Tribune," Mr. Chamberlain asserted that British hegemony over the Transvaal was necessary to the peace, security, and general welfare of the British Empire in South Africa. This is the first and great postulate, and the second is like unto it: the English people believe that more benefit to humanity is to be expected from an extension of the British Empire than from the existence of Dutch republics. Upon these two postulates is based the British case against the South African Republics.

In his address before the Diocesan Convention at Albany, in November, 1899, Bishop Doane, in referring to affairs in South Africa, said "he believed that Mr. Kipling's crystal condensation of the purpose and the issue of the whole matter is true, and that it may be the misfortune, or it may be the opportunity, that in great matters of this sort the old saying holds good—*nulla vestigia retrorsum*." It is somewhat startling to have a right reverend prelate speak in acquiescence with the persistent aggressions upon the South African Republic, and in approval of Mr. Kipling's presentation of the matter in his music-hall jingles. But the British Government did take a step backward in 1884, not in a spirit of sublimated philanthropy, but for business reasons, when it made a full restoration of the Transvaal as not worth keeping. The spiritual and social welfare of the Boers was not

then considered, for the new gospel of missionary philanthropy had not yet been actively proclaimed. Business considerations again governed when the English people became aware that, inadvertently, they had given up a good thing in 1884. Mines and capitalistic schemes, not missionary zeal, actuated the British Government in 1886, when it began to devise measures for recovering what it had justly, though somewhat contemptuously restored, in ignorance of its full importance.

These measures, nearly all of an aggressive nature, tending toward a virtual reannexation of the Transvaal to the British Empire, constitute the case of the South African Republic against Great Britain.

It having been asserted by Mr. Chamberlain and others of the present British Government that British hegemony or suzerainty over the Transvaal was necessary for the security of the British Empire in South Africa, the inevitable corollary followed, that necessity has no law.

“So spake the fiend, and, with necessity,
The tyrant’s plea, excused his devilish deeds.”

An outright aggression, such as the annexation of 1877, would hardly be repeated. In order, therefore, to give the plea of necessity some reasonableness, charges of grievances were instituted and added to from time to time, such as might indicate a condition of affairs prejudicial to the material interests of the British Empire, and *a priori* to the good of humanity.

The work of giving form and seeming substance to the grievances was largely done by the colonial bureaucracy, but the chief promoters of the scheme, following the lead of Cecil Rhodes and Sir Alfred Milner, were active members of the South African League. In regard to that league we have the testimony of Sir William Butler, late commander-in-chief of British troops in South Africa. While temporarily occu-

pying the post of High Commissioner, during the absence, on leave, of Sir Alfred Milner, General Butler reported to the Colonial Office in London that "the disquiet in Johannesburg was far more due to the manœuvres of the South African League than to the Boer Government." When Sir Alfred Milner wished the Natal garrisons to be strengthened, General Butler said that if war was expected such action would be ridiculous from a military point of view; he said, further, that if war broke out, "the first thing necessary would be to withdraw the garrisons in a hurry, so as to avoid having them locked up by the Boers." Exactly what General Butler anticipated might happen did happen, and the campaign in its later stages, under General Roberts, was conducted on lines such as had been urged at the outset, in the event of war, by General Butler. Could Milner, Rhodes, and Chamberlain, together with the South African League, have been bottled up in 1898, General Butler remaining in command, no English troops would have been locked up in Kimberley, Ladysmith, or Mafeking, and it is almost certain that the war would have been averted. The Boers were ready to concede English demands, but the colonial marplots, backed by Mr. Chamberlain, did not desire concessions—they wanted full control of the mines of the Transvaal. When Mr. Chamberlain said in Parliament that he really meant to accept President Kruger's offers in regard to the franchise, Sir Edward Clarke replied: "You intended to accept and avert war, yet you did not draw up your note so as to make your meaning clear, and when you found that the Boers did not understand you to accept, you did not lift a finger or telegraph a word to clear up the matter."

Mr. Chamberlain is well known to have the power of lucid expression; his misty phrases and reticence were assumed on the occasion referred to by Sir Edward Clarke, in accordance with a predetermined policy of aggression upon the South African Republic. This is made clear enough in the Blue Book, which contains a report of the latest negotiations

before the outbreak of war in 1899, and that report also shows the working of the curiously elastic phrase "irreducible minimum" by the English colonial negotiators.

The "minimum," although irreducible, could quickly be made expansible by the Milner, Rhodes, and Chamberlain combination whenever the Boers seemed ready to accede to some demand or ultimatum that had been submitted to them as an "irreducible minimum."

The Transvaal Government, after much discussion, was ready to pass a satisfactory enfranchising act, such as Mr. Chamberlain admitted he was willing to accept, and to make further concessions, upon the condition that Great Britain should abandon her claim of suzerainty, which, the Boers insisted, had been finally abolished by the London Convention of 1884. Great Britain demanded the passage of the enfranchising act, and other measures, while insisting upon the suzerainty or overlordship, and reserving for future discussion and action matters of wider importance than even the franchise, all relating to the internal affairs of the Transvaal, in which the British Government had repeatedly disclaimed any right to interfere. The "irreducible minimum," contrariwise to the offer of the Sibylline leaves, having expanded very expansively, the Boers at length perceived they were being trifled with by the colonial promoters of a predetermined raid upon their country; and it was also discovered that the British army was being heavily reinforced and stationed in pursuance of an organized plan of attack upon the Transvaal. Negotiations were therefore suddenly closed, and the Republic was thus driven a second time to take up arms in defense of its territory and independence against the British Empire.

The disorders in Johannesburg, of which so much has been said and written, were such as are common in all mining communities. Disorderly acts by Uitlanders made it necessary for the Transvaal Government to take repressive and sometimes retaliatory measures, not only for the preserva-

tion of some sort of order, but in self-defense. Few of the Uitlanders were there as colonists; nearly all were gold-hunters. They cared nothing for the Republic, most of them; those from Great Britain in particular; preferred to hold allegiance to their own countries, without the franchise in the Transvaal, than to secure the franchise, by renouncing their home allegiance. Their grievances were not discovered by themselves. Like Canning's "Needy Knife Grinder," they had no story to tell until one had been fabricated for them by colonial friends of humanity, otherwise known as fomenters of discontent. What they wanted was to get gold and return home as soon as possible. Where are they now? The Milner, Rhodes, and Chamberlain combination has no further use for them as human stalking-horses, for the raid upon the Transvaal is now well advanced, and is backed by the power of the British Empire. Few of these Uitlanders are in the British army in South Africa or in any branch of service there, but there are many in the United States and Europe who have become conscious of a substantial grievance in being unable to get to work in the Witwatersrand Gold Mines, where they would gladly return, even under the conditions that existed at the time the Boers of the Transvaal were a second time goaded into defensive hostilities against the British Empire.

The Boers have been described as a people not up to date in their government, in social science, in the arts of civilization, and in the higher culture generally. If we consider the conditions of their existence in South Africa for more than a half-century we shall justly classify all who are now living among survivals of the fittest. We have been told by students of anthropology that progress of the human species is not possible except by means of evolution and a vigorous weeding out and extermination of imperfect specimens. The Boers, much against their will, have been the subjects of a similar rigid treatment. In their successive efforts as pioneers of civilization in the wilds of South Africa to establish

and maintain homes in that country they have been alternately, sometimes simultaneously, harassed by attacks of savage tribes and by imperial aggressions. A stable condition is necessary for the higher culture of the human species; this condition the Boers of the Transvaal had hoped to attain after their independence had been acknowledged by Great Britain. As pioneers, the men of the South African Republic have no superiors; their lives have been strenuous in the extreme, and they have perfect adaptability for their work, which, for them, is the best culture. When Napoleon was asked by Madame de Staël who was the greatest woman, he replied: "She who has given birth to most children." The Boer women in domestic life are eminently helpmates to the men, and as mothers most of them may be called great, according to Napoleon's definition, so that their personal adaptability to present conditions in the Transvaal is as perfect as that of the men. Should any of the children survive the savage and imperial aggressions that have beset their parents and homes and attain a peaceful existence, they may attempt the higher culture.

More absurd, as well as insulting, than demands based upon a deleted word with an "artificial value," is the proposed seizure and occupation of the Transvaal by Great Britain in conformity with the humanitarian or missionary cant of the day, as set forth in the new gospel of philanthropy by Rudyard Kipling in his "White Man's Burden," and other verses. The injustice of the proposed application of that gospel to the Boers of the Transvaal can be easily shown.

It is generally assumed that no aboriginal people have any territorial rights that Christian nations are bound to respect. The Boers of the Transvaal, by treaty with the British Government in 1852, obtained the territory which they have since occupied, and they have extended their borders by annexations. These transactions, as reported by Mr. Chamberlain, afford a side-show of Great Britain's "sphere of influence."

This phrase, "sphere of influence," of indefinitely inclusive

application, has been construed by statesmen of powerful Christian nations to mean anything that has been found desirable and possible to do in the direction of territorial aggrandizement. It is a good phrase from the Britisher's point of view—more vague, while less cynical in form, than "might is right," and meaning practically the same thing.

In his speech of June 26, 1899, Mr. Chamberlain said that "the British Government, as a conciliatory measure, acting upon the advice of Cecil Rhodes, agreed in 1888 to recognize the fruit of one raid by handing over to the Boers a part of Zululand." In 1890, also by advice of Mr. Rhodes, the British gave authority in Swaziland to the Boers, whereby, Mr. Chamberlain admits, his government "sacrificed to some extent the interests of natives who had trusted to its protection."

In return for these and other concessions intended as conciliatory measures, some of which Mr. Chamberlain goes on to say "enabled the Boers to profit by their own misdoing," the Britishers expected reciprocity in some form, instead of which they seem to have suffered something like a moral Majuba; for in the same speech Mr. Chamberlain informs us that all the grievances of the Uitlanders, of which so much had been heard, dated from the time when these attempts at conciliation were made.

All this is very painful, alike to the friends of the Britisher and of the Boer; but only the pen of a Pecksniff could adequately deal with the situation.

These aggressions by the South African Republic for territorial expansion, in which Great Britain was a consenting party, cannot be approved; they are simply mentioned to show that the Republic has conformed, so far as its opportunities have served, to the practice of the great Christian nations of the world in the same direction, and has consequently been elevated or reduced to their level. No up-to-date missionary Christian of the gospel according to Kipling type, can therefore consistently advocate the application of that gospel to the Boers of the Transvaal.

The Jameson Raid of 1895 was a mere incident in an organized colonial conspiracy against the South African Republic. The movement can be better understood if we consider the governmental conditions in the British colonies of South Africa.

Mr. Cecil Rhodes, whether in or out of office, has occupied a position there much like that of a "boss" in New York city or Philadelphia, Sir Alfred Milner, High Commissioner, being his powerful official coadjutor, and the South African League his "ring" of supporters. Mr. Chamberlain has been an indispensable backer to this colonial capitalistic combination, his potentiality as Colonial Secretary being far greater than that of a Governor of New York or of Pennsylvania, even should one of those high officials be willing to assist in a capitalistic conspiracy.

The men who were engaged in the Jameson Raid were mostly members of the colonial police, and were under command of British army officers. There were some Americans in the expedition. It had been expected that the Uitlanders of Johannesburg, whose grievances had been declared to be intolerable, would rise *en masse* and join the movement, which might then have been called a revolution. But the Uitlanders regarded the raiders with cold though perhaps not altogether unsympathetic eyes, and seemed to have no heart for a fight with the Boers, preferring to go on with their profitable gold-digging.

The Boer Government meantime was anxiously watching the movement, and when its object had become fully manifest, a detachment of burghers surrounded the raiders, and, after a sharp fight, captured the entire body. Mr. Poultney Bigelow, in his interesting volume entitled "White Man's Africa," tells us that at the close of the fight, "when the Boers had silenced the fire of Jameson's men and had defeated what they had feared might prove an invasion fatal to their independence, and while the dead lay yet unburied about them, they kneeled and followed the prayers offered by their elders,

giving thanks to God for having protected them. They prayed against the spirit of boasting, and for Jameson and his men, that they might be guided by the light of justice and Christian fellowship."

The Boers treated the raiders with great clemency; a fine was imposed upon some of the leaders, but the entire body was surrendered to the British Government to be dealt with according to law. Neither officers nor men received any adequate punishment for their crime of levying war upon a foreign state. Cecil Rhodes was then in office at Cape Colony. A parliamentary committee was appointed to investigate the raid, and found Mr. Rhodes guilty of dishonorable conduct, yet he remained a privy councilor, and returned to Rhodesia as dictator there.

The raid was, in truth, condemned only because it had been a failure. Had it attained any appearance of importance it would unquestionably have been sustained by the Colonial Office. Although a failure, it served as a warning to the Boers, for it disclosed an animus and a purpose which called for defensive measures. There had been no armament in the Transvaal before the Jameson Raid, but forts were built and armed soon afterward at Pretoria and Johannesburg, and other preparations made for the protection of the country against lawless outbreaks. These preparations have been distorted into a heinous count in the long indictment of the Boers by the British. They do not need vindication; they were prudential measures, such as the Transvaal Government deemed wise, and the course of the colonial conspirators since the raid has shown that they were necessary.

Mr. Chamberlain's utterances in regard to the raid were in harmony with public opinion, but they show that he wished to avoid taking any step backward, as a consequence of it, in his general policy of aggression upon the Transvaal.

In addressing the Chartered Company of Cape Colony, immediately after the raid, he imperiously "desires it to note that the South African Republic is a *foreign* state with which

Her Majesty is at peace and in treaty relations.” In a speech delivered February 11, 1896, mentioning the raid and trials of its leaders, Mr. Chamberlain said: “I am one of the first to recognize the moderation and the magnanimity that President Kruger has shown in regard to recent events.” In his speech of June 26, 1899, he said: “One thing in common fairness has to be placed on the other side in drawing up the balance-sheet of our relations with the Transvaal, and that is the Jameson Raid. I have never said a word—I could not—of that most mischievous proceeding. An invasion of a state with whom we were on terms of friendship, an invasion by a foreign force, for that there is nothing to be said in excuse. But that great fault has been, I think, sufficiently atoned for. The effect of the raid was disastrous. It was to put British subjects in the wrong; it was to tie the hands of Her Majesty’s government. Under the circumstances it was not open to us to press for reforms, and for the last three years our attitude has been one of patience and self-control. We have endeavored to avoid the necessity of pressure, and we have relied upon the promise of President Kruger to grant reasonable reforms, and to forget and forgive.”

All this constitutes what Mr. Chamberlain called an atonement for the raid. But he omitted to mention his justification of Cecil Rhodes, the principal and prime mover in the raid, Jameson being merely the agent. President Kruger has a vivid recollection of that justification, which accounts for what Mr. Chamberlain called “the disease of suspicion chronic among the Boers,” and which forms another count in the indictment against the Government of the Transvaal.

The “atonement” was merely refraining for a time from meddling in the internal affairs of the Republic, and was as baseless as the fabric of a dream in the light of Mr. Chamberlain’s declaration in behalf of Her Majesty’s government, in the House of Commons on February 13, 1896, when he said: “We have explicitly repudiated every right of interference in the internal affairs of the Transvaal.”

During this period of three years, immediately after the "mischievous" Jameson Raid, while the British Government was refraining, by way of "atonement," from doing what it had explicitly repudiated the right to do, Mr. Chamberlain evolved a new equivalent for the deleted word with an "artificial value." The phrase was first declared in 1896, and having been insisted upon ever since, despite the protests of President Kruger, has been regarded by the British Government as having been virtually established. This addition to the arbitrary pronouncements in the British case against the Boers is a reassertion of suzerainty; or, to be precise, is an assertion of an enlarged constructive meaning of it, the word not being used, for it had been stricken from the latest treaty between Great Britain and the Republic by consent of both parties. It is merely Mr. Chamberlain's *ipse dixit*, or his manifesto, and is certainly a strange outcome of an "atonement" for a murderous outrage such as the Jameson Raid.

It is a declaration that "Great Britain is justified, in the interests of South Africa as a whole, in tendering her friendly counsels to the Transvaal Government in regard to its internal affairs—under pressure, if necessary; and should the delay continue we shall not hold ourselves limited by what we have already offered." A similar blustering declaration was made by Great Britain to the United States during the secession troubles, but the significant comment by Charles Francis Adams, "My lord, this means war," closed the incident.

In the construction of the British case against the Boers of the Transvaal, treaties which have been accepted by both governments after full negotiations, seem to have had less contributory use by the present government in England than abstract conceptions of alleged fundamentals by British officials, set forth in euphemistic words and phrases. Lord Kimberley, in the House of Lords, on October 18, 1899, having said that the word suzerainty has no meaning, Lord Salisbury replied: "That view, as suggested by the noble earl to whom we owe the word, is deserving of consideration.

[Laughter.] My impression is not that it does not mean absolutely nothing, but it means a number of things of which you can take your choice. Though it may be perfectly true that the word in itself has no distinct or sufficient meaning, it is still true that, having been put into the treaty, it has obtained an artificial value and meaning which prevents us from entirely abandoning it. We cannot drop it and restore things to the condition in which they were before the word suzerainty was adopted. If we were to drop it we should be intimating that the ideas which have come to be associated with it are ideas which we repudiate and abandon altogether. Of course that is a position we cannot adopt."

This grotesque discussion of an unmeaning word by British statesmen seems like a heavy travesty upon some topsy-turvy incident from "Alice in Wonderland," without any of the humor which makes that work so enjoyable.

Suzerainty, according to high officials of the British Government, is a meaningless word with an artificial value meaning a number of things of which you—that is, the British Government—can take your choice. It was stricken from the treaty with the Boers, yet, in some undefined way, is still constructively existent there as an important constituent element, having become associated with ideas which the British cannot abandon.

After reading Lord Salisbury's exposition of suzerainty and its tortuous applications, it is not surprising that the Boers have insisted upon the use of the Dutch language in conducting their internal affairs.

It is a premise, abundantly sustained by evidence, that the great body of the English people, as well as a majority of the present British Government, had no desire to encroach upon the rights of the Boers or to provoke their hostility. The colonial conspirators, with the coöperation of Mr. Chamberlain, could therefore only accomplish their object by forcing the Boers, in self-defense, to take the initiative. Two lines of work, entirely distinct, were necessary—one to be operated

in South Africa, the other in England. The South African League attended to the business of prodding the Transvaal Government, setting up a dismal howl whenever a return blow was landed upon them by the Boers, the howl being echoed by interested allies of the conspirators in England, who had no tears to shed for the persecuted Boers who were guarding their territory and endeavoring to maintain their independence. The colonial newspapers aided in the work, and articles from them of an inflammatory nature were copied into English Blue Books. One of the devices of the league was a monster petition to be sent to Queen Victoria. Canvassers were employed who, in addition to their pay, received so much per sheet of signatures. It produced little effect, as its absurdity and bogus nature were apparent. The work of Sir Alfred Milner, High Commissioner, was of a better order. The brilliant conception of an "irreducible minimum," with contingent expansive action, was one of his inspirations, and, as has been seen, was an eminent success. Together with threatening movements of British troops, it compelled the Boers, in self-defense, to take the initiative, and thus, by a trick, the capitalistic combination, in concert of action with their backers in England, secured the support of the British Government in the colonial conspiracy against the South African Republic, which had been the object of the abortive Jameson Raid.

The work in England has been mostly of a justificatory nature. What the Boers regarded as aggression upon their rights were represented by the Colonial Secretary and his supporters as necessary measures for the maintenance of Great Britain's claim of paramount power over South Africa. This paramountcy or suzerainty had not been asserted by Great Britain over the Orange Free State for the reason that its only important possession, the diamond mines, had passed from the jurisdiction of the Free State into the control of Cecil Rhodes, backed by foreign financiers, leaving nothing considered worth gathering in. British interests had been

thoroughly looked after in that country, for, to use an expression of Mr. Chamberlain's, it may be said that the Free State was "a sponge that had been well squeezed." The diamond mines were near the border of a British colony. It was only necessary to slice off part of the Free State in which the mines were situated and annex it. This was done, against the protests of the Government of the Free State, which only received for the mines a pittance much less than their yield for a single year. The Witwatersrand gold mines, being situated in the heart of the Transvaal territory, presented difficulties which did not exist in the case of the Kimberley diamond mines. The attempt by the Colonial Secretary and his supporters in England to establish a *casus belli* upon the alleged grievances of British subjects in the Transvaal was not sustained by public opinion in England, nor by some influential members of the government.

There are hundreds of thousands in England, not foreigners, but British workmen, earning daily wages by honest toil, who are deprived of the Parliamentary franchise by the preposterous registration laws in force there. Why, it was asked, should Great Britain make war upon the South African Republic to obtain votes there for fifty thousand Uitlanders, while more than ten times that number of Englishmen are deprived of the franchise at home? Before he became a Tory, Mr. Chamberlain was a mourner over the wrongs of these disenfranchised Englishmen, but now he would willingly, by conscription, make "absent-minded beggars" of them all in furtherance of the colonial conspiracy.

The conspiracy, in the hands of Sir Alfred Milner and the capitalistic league, having made good progress, as we have seen, it was time for action, in the concerted purpose, in England. The colonial wolf was ready and anxious to devour, but, until the "minimum" had been unmasked by Sir Alfred Milner and threatening military preparations made, the predestinated Boer victim, like a tough old ram, stood at bay, disinclined to take the initiative, but who could not

be so easily gobbled up as the feeble lamb mentioned by Esop.

Mr. Chamberlain's declaration of 1896 embodied all the demands that had been most resolutely opposed by the Boers, and that declaration, with variations, had been said or published at stated times during the entire "atonement" period as a sort of litany, to strengthen the purpose of the colonial conspirators and their allies in England, and to console them for the delay which Mr. Chamberlain considered proper on account of the Jameson Raid.

On the 26th of August, 1899, Mr. Chamberlain, in acquiescence with and in justification of the denouement of the colonial conspiracy in South Africa against the Transvaal Republic, repeated his declaration of 1896, and also said: "I do not think it will be denied that we have exhibited unparalleled patience in the relations between a paramount and a subordinate power," a phrase in which he begged the whole question, for there is no law, treaty, or right justifying the claim assumed in that phrase, other than the law of might.

But the whole British case against the South African Republic, as presented in official reports, Parliamentary statements, and speeches, is a miserable pretext. The mass of details in its construction is enormous, but nowhere in the vast collection of material is the truth even hinted at, although it can be stated in a very few words. It is not a question of franchise nor of grievances, whether actual or imaginary. What is wanted by the colonial conspirators and Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary, for whose schemes and actions the British Government has now become responsible, is full possession and control of the country and the mines of the Transvaal.

"An American View of the Boer War," by Edward J. Hodgson, appears in the "Nineteenth Century" for August, 1900. Mr. Hodgson begins his view in 1652, two hundred years too early. Events in South Africa prior to 1852, so far as the Transvaal question is concerned, belong to the history

of colonization there by European nations, and to the history of slavery. Many occurrences in those histories have not been in accordance with the moral law or the golden rule. Mr. Hodgson has mentioned some instances of Dutch methods which, if authentic, were certainly open to condemnation. But these objectionable methods have been common in the practice of all Christian nations in dealing with aboriginal peoples, and in their efforts to establish "spheres of influence." The preponderance of inhumanity in the work of colonization and in the treatment of slaves, ascribed by each nation to the others, cannot now be adjusted. In their methods the Dutch will at least compare favorably with the English, but in any case degrees of inhumanity, whether low or high, do not carry honors. Neither English nor American writers have given much attention to the grievances of the Boers in their efforts to attain a stable existence in successive settlements in South Africa. By patience and dogged tenacity, after repeated failures, the Boers had made new homesteads for themselves in the Transvaal, and when, in 1852, that territory was ceded to them, with an acknowledgment of their independence, they were disposed to forgive and forget their sufferings during many previous years, which for the most part had been caused by the inhumanity of the English. What Mr. Hodgson and others have called the "bumptious and domineering ultimatum of the Republic in 1899" should more justly be regarded as a manly and proper answer to the overbearing and insulting usurpation of the Government of the Transvaal proposed in the expanded "irreducible minimum," backed by a threatening force of the British army.

An equally arrogant asserted right by the British Government was the cause of the War of 1812 between the United States and Great Britain. The assumed right of impressment from American ships, like the demand of the franchise in the Transvaal for aliens, could not be justified. Both were merely tentative means toward a predetermined end. When General Jackson mowed down British troops, as Lord

Kitchener mowed down the dervishes, he averted what at that period in the history of the United States might have proved a dangerous aggression. The battle of New Orleans was fought in ignorance of the treaty of peace which had been negotiated, but had the British defeated General Jackson no such little trifle as a peace treaty would have deterred the British Government from attempting to seize the Mississippi River and the country west of it, which it greatly coveted, as it has now made itself responsible for the colonial conspiracy against the South African Republic, in violation of the treaties of 1852 and 1884 with the Boers of the Transvaal.

Mr. Hodgson contends that "if the moralities and equities between the two belligerents were equal, and there was no clear preponderance of right on the side of the English, we should still be under obligation to give them our sympathy because they are our best customers."

This strictly shop-keeping view reads strangely, coming, as it does, from Minnesota, and it is to be hoped that a contention so pitiful has few supporters among American citizens. The United States offer their agricultural products and manufactures to the world, confident of their excellence. If Great Britain buys more largely than other nations it is because she needs more and cannot make better bargains elsewhere. Good will has as little to do with the commerce of nations as with the purchases by women at bargain counters. If presidential election platforms have any meaning as expressions of public opinion we shall be justified in the belief that a majority of the people of the United States are in sympathy with the Boers in their unequal fight with the British, for this sympathy is plainly expressed in the latest platforms of both the great parties—being more effectively stated in the Republican platform than in the other. The Convention at Philadelphia, when endorsing President McKinley's action in tendering his friendly offices in the interests of peace, also declared that "the American people earnestly hope that a way may soon be found, honorable alike to both contending par-

ties, to terminate the strife between them," thus referring to the conflict as one between sovereign states, and apparently ignoring the annexation of the Orange Free State which had just then been proclaimed.

If the capitalistic combination in South Africa could have gained possession of the gold mines in the Transvaal as easily as the diamond mines in the Orange Free State had been secured there would have been no occasion for such abstruse studies as that of suzerainty and its various meanings, especially in its application to the Transvaal Republic; nor would a war of aggression upon the remaining territory of the Republic in the interests of civilization and humanity have been then regarded as urgent or even desirable.

But conditions have now become entirely changed. In its support of the colonial scheme for an usurpation of the Government of the Transvaal, the British Government cannot plead a compelling necessity, which is the motive force of imperialism in its assumed duty of expansion, for it had explicitly repudiated any intention to seize either the mines or the territory of the Transvaal. It was drawn into the disreputable business by a trick of the colonial conspirators, and has now much more on its hands than it expected. The continued existence of the South African Republic has been declared to be incompatible with the safety of the British Empire, and both the Orange Free State and the South African Republic have been annexed by proclamation, under a royal warrant, and declared to be British territory. All pretexts are thrown aside; the movement is now seen to have been a raid for conquest, and Boers who continue to fight for their rights and their country will hereafter be treated as rebels. The victory that Great Britain may eventually achieve will be more disgraceful to the present British Government than Majuba defeats, many times repeated. Since the Jameson Raid, when the Boers were rudely awakened to a sense of their insecurity, the course of the British Government, in concert with colonial conspirators, has been marked by deceit,

mendacity, and hypocrisy. At a sacrifice of British soldiers numbering more than the entire fighting force of the Republics, and at a cost of over seven hundred millions of dollars, the British Empire has extended its borders by an usurpation of the territory of the Republics which the Boers, after many years of struggle with man and nature, had gained by treaty with the Empire. The future historian may be puzzled to explain the apparent insignificance of the result achieved when compared with the enormous sacrifice of lives and treasure in the prosecution of the imperial raid. Youthful Boers, who may attain the higher culture under the fostering care of the usurper, may perhaps in the course of their classical studies, reading in the ancient poets, come upon the verse, "For an enduring heart have the destinies appointed to the children of men," and be sadly reminded of the sufferings of their forefathers; but the following lines, by an Englishman lately resident in Johannesburg, who is evidently not a Jingo, have more timely interest as well as warning for us:

"Gods of the Jingo—Brass and Gold—
 Lords of the world by "right divine,"
 Beneath whose baneful sway we hold
 The motto, "All that's thine is mine,"
 Such Lords as these have made men rotten;
 They have forgotten—they have forgotten.

"They've "got the gold, the ships, the men,"
 And are the masters of to-morrow—
 And so mankind shall see again
 The days of Sodom and Gomorrah.
 These are the Lords that make men rotten;
 They have forgotten—they have forgotten.

"Drunken with lust of power and pelf,
 They hold nor man nor God in awe;
 And care for naught but only Self,
 And cent.-per-cent.'s their only law.
 These are our Lords, and they are rotten;
 They have forgotten—they have forgotten."

Bernard Holland wrote as follows in a recent number of the "National Review": "Perhaps the most permanent result of our [England's] occupation of India will be, not the ever-precarious Empire itself, but restoration, under influences flowing from the East, of the true and essential meaning of our own religion, so debased in the West by association with utilitarian ends, optimistic philosophy, and worldly prosperity."

That would indeed be a blessing, could it be realized and enter into the hearts, not only of the people of England, but of all Christian nations.

No such good for England, nor any permanent material or business advantage, can be expected to follow the capitalistic raid upon the Boers of South Africa, now backed by the Government of Great Britain. That iniquitous aggression will have a Nemesic result, and the story of the infamy will occupy a prominent place in early chapters of the history of the decline and fall of the British Empire.

